CNN Central News & Network-ITDC India Epress/ITDC News Delhi: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India has once again placed defence cooperation at the centre of the India-Russia strategic relationship. Among the most closely watched issues is Moscow’s renewed offer of the Su-57, its fifth-generation stealth fighter, to India. Russia has indicated that discussions could include technology sharing and possible cooperation in production.
For India, however, the question should not simply be whether to buy the Su-57. The more important question is what kind of air-power capability India needs over the next two decades and how any foreign acquisition can strengthen, rather than weaken, its long-term ambition for an indigenous fifth-generation fighter.
India currently does not operate a fifth-generation fighter, while China has already deployed the J-20 and continues to develop advanced combat-aircraft capabilities. Pakistan is also reported to be exploring access to Chinese fifth-generation aircraft. This creates a genuine capability gap for India and makes the debate over an interim solution strategically important.
The Su-57 therefore cannot be dismissed merely as another foreign defence proposal. At the same time, it cannot be accepted simply because India faces an urgent capability requirement.
The first test must be operational effectiveness. India needs to independently evaluate the aircraft’s stealth characteristics, radar and sensors, electronic warfare systems, weapons integration, engine performance, networking capabilities and ability to operate alongside existing Indian platforms. A fifth-generation label by itself cannot guarantee battlefield superiority.
The second and perhaps more important issue is technology transfer. Russia has indicated its willingness to discuss production technologies with India, while other reports have highlighted proposals involving local manufacturing and access to sensitive technologies.
India should insist that any technology-transfer agreement be meaningful. Merely assembling imported components in India would not represent genuine technological self-reliance. The country needs access to manufacturing know-how, maintenance capabilities, upgrades, software and critical aerospace technologies wherever possible. The real value of such a deal would lie not only in the number of aircraft delivered, but in how much capability it creates within India.
This is particularly important because India’s indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, or AMCA, remains the long-term answer to its fifth-generation fighter requirement. Reports have suggested that the Su-57 could serve as a stop-gap option while the AMCA programme develops.
A foreign fighter should therefore complement the AMCA, not compete with it.
India has already experienced the difficulties of attempting to develop a fifth-generation aircraft through the earlier India-Russia Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft programme. New Delhi eventually withdrew from that effort amid concerns relating to cost, technology access and aircraft capabilities. Any new arrangement must learn from that experience.
There is also the question of cost. The price of a fighter aircraft cannot be judged only by its purchase price. India must calculate the complete life-cycle cost, including engines, weapons, spare parts, maintenance, training, infrastructure, upgrades and long-term availability. An aircraft that appears affordable at the acquisition stage can become expensive over decades of operation.
Supply-chain security is another factor that cannot be ignored. Russia remains an important defence partner for India, but the geopolitical environment has changed significantly. Western sanctions on Moscow and the disruption of international defence supply chains have demonstrated the risks associated with depending heavily on any single external source. India must ensure that a future fighter fleet can be supported reliably throughout its operational life.
Yet strategic autonomy does not mean avoiding Russian defence cooperation. India has a long history of military and technological collaboration with Russia, including the BrahMos programme. The two countries are also discussing further defence cooperation and possible upgrades to existing systems.
The right approach, therefore, is neither unconditional acceptance nor automatic rejection.
India should use the Su-57 proposal to negotiate from a position of strength. If Russia is genuinely prepared to offer deep technology transfer, local manufacturing and meaningful industrial cooperation, New Delhi should examine the proposal seriously. But every promise must be translated into legally enforceable terms, measurable milestones and verifiable access to technology.
There is also a larger strategic question. Modern air warfare is no longer determined by individual aircraft alone. Satellites, airborne early-warning systems, drones, missiles, electronic warfare, secure communications, artificial intelligence and network-centric operations increasingly determine the effectiveness of an air force. India should therefore evaluate the Su-57 as part of an integrated combat ecosystem rather than as a standalone platform.
The current India-Russia relationship also extends far beyond defence. Putin’s visit comes at a time when both countries are seeking to deepen cooperation in trade, energy, nuclear power, manufacturing and other sectors. This broader relationship provides space for India to negotiate a defence arrangement that delivers industrial and technological value, rather than simply importing another weapons system.
For the government, transparency will be important. If negotiations progress, the public debate should be based on credible information about costs, timelines, technology transfer and operational requirements. Defence procurement involves national security, so every detail cannot be made public, but the broad strategic rationale should be clearly explained.
India cannot afford a capability vacuum while waiting indefinitely for indigenous fifth-generation technology. At the same time, it cannot allow an urgent requirement to become an excuse for postponing domestic aerospace development.
The Su-57 decision should therefore be guided by one principle: India must buy capability while building independence.
If the Russian offer can provide an immediate boost to India’s air power, genuine technology transfer, domestic manufacturing experience and useful technological inputs for the wider aerospace ecosystem, it deserves serious consideration. If it merely creates another long-term dependence on imported systems, India should be prepared to walk away.
The ultimate objective should not be to possess the maximum number of fifth-generation aircraft. It should be to build an Indian air force that can design, manufacture, operate, maintain and upgrade advanced combat systems with increasing independence.
The Su-57 may become part of that journey—but it should never become a substitute for it.
For India, the real choice is not simply between the Su-57 and another fighter. It is between remaining a buyer of advanced air power and becoming a creator of it. The decision taken today must serve the security requirements of the present without compromising the technological ambitions of tomorrow.
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